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1 Introduction
Domestic rms respond to trade liberalization in a number of ways. As import tari¤s
fall, some rms shrink and eventually exit their market altogether, whereas others adapt
and survive. Those who survive do so in several ways  recent work has shown that
rms respond by increasing their innovation e¤orts (Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen,
2011; Teshima, 2010), by increasing the quality of their products (Khandelwal, 2010),
by refocusing their product scope on core competencies (Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano,
2013; Liu, 2010), or by decentralizing their management hierarchy (Bloom, Sadun and
Van Reenen, 2010).
In this paper we use UK rm-level data to focus on a new channel of adjustment,
namely the shift toward increased provision of services in lieu of goods production. An
initial look at the data suggests that this shift was potentially signicant. Between 1997
and 2007 UK manufacturing import tari¤s fell, in large part as a consequence of the
implementation of the Uruguay Round (Figure 1). At the same time, UK manufacturing
experienced a shift toward services provision relative to goods production (Figure 2).
This relative decline in domestic goods production was accompanied by a leveling o¤ of
domestic production in absolute terms and happened despite the fact that overall demand
for goods grew rapidly over the period.1 The reorientation toward services has also been
important for overall activity in the manufacturing sector. Had the manufacturing sector
not undergone this transition toward increased services provision its share of total output
would have been 10 percent in 2007, rather than the 13 percent that it represented.
Thus, the long-running decline of manufacturing has at least in part been slowed by
manufacturing becoming more services-oriented.
The shift into services production is also visible at the level of individual rms. Speci-
cally, using UK rm-level data described in more detail below, we nd that the correlation
between the log of goods revenues and the log of services revenues is -0.35. This suggests
that the shift towards services may have taken place at the level of individual rms, and
may not have been simply a consequence of the reallocation of output shares toward more
service-intensive rms or sectors. Considered in light of these trends, existing UK rms
seem to have been, on average, re-orienting production toward services.
In this paper, we use rm-level data for the UK over the period 1997-2007 to fur-
ther explore the link between reductions in manufacturing import tari¤s and the rms
tradeo¤ between goods production and the provision of services.2 We nd that lower
tari¤s are strongly associated with a shift to greater services provision relative to goods
production. These results are robust to controlling for changes in manufacturing export
1U.K. manufacturing grew less than half a percent per year over the period while total U.K. goods
consumption nearly doubled. See ONS (2007).
2See Appendix A for more details regarding the types of services provided by UK manufacturing
rms.
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tari¤s, changes in services trade barriers, rm xed e¤ects and a number of time-varying
rm-level covariates, as well as industry-specic time trends. We also show that the rela-
tive increase in services provision in response to lower manufacturing tari¤s is driven by
both an absolute reduction in goods production and, in particular, an absolute increase
in services provision.
We motivate the empirics with a tractable model of trade liberalization and rm-level
production choice. In the model, rms allocate their (scarce) stock of accumulated indus-
try expertise in order to augment the productivity of their goods and services production.
A rms expertise is both conned to the rm and rivalrous in its use across goods and
services production. We show that one implication of this is that the greater a rms
stock of industry expertise the easier it is for the rm to adjust its production strategy
in the face of changing market conditions.3 In light of the model, we augment our re-
gression specication in order to explore the rm-level determinants of the magnitude of
the response to trade liberalization. In other words, we ask: why are some rms able to
alter their production strategies in the face of lower manufacturing import tari¤s while
others are not? Following the prediction of the model we focus on the role of the rms
accumulated expertise, as embodied by the rms stock of research and development.
The empirical results suggest an important role for this proxy for expertise in facilitating
the transition to more intensive services provision in the face of goods market trade lib-
eralization. In contrast, a larger physical capital stock is associated with a signicantly
weaker shift into services.
There is a small literature that documents the servitizationof manufacturing,4 and
it is usefully reviewed in Baines, et al. (2009). As these authorsdescribe, a particular
focus of the literature is on service provision as an opportunity to di¤erentiate from
products originating from lower cost economies, which is in line with the question we
address here. Similarly, Neely, et al. (2011) document global trends in servitization
nding that, around the world, approximately 30 percent of manufacturing rms with
over 100 employees produce services.5 In contrast to this line of research, we apply a
formal econometric strategy to explore a specic determinant of the shift to increased
services provision by goods producers, namely trade liberalization. We show that this
determinant was quantitatively important over our sample period, with manufacturing
import tari¤ reductions explaining around half of the increase in the ratio of services
revenues to goods revenues at rm-level between 1997 and 2007.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an illustrative model; Section 3
3We discuss the notion of expertise which is transferable between goods and services production in
more detail below. In the U.K., a well-known example of a manufacturing rm which has used its
accumulated manufacturing expertise to successfully shift into service provision is Rolls Royce: around
50 percent of its revenues now come from the provision of services rather than goods (see Neely, 2011).
4Vandermerewe and Rada (1988) dene servitization as the process of creating value by adding services
to products, a denition that is mostly adopted throughout this literature.
5See also Crozet and Milet (2014) who document the servitization of French manufacturing.
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describes our econometric methodology and data; Section 4 presents estimation results;
and Section 5 concludes.
2 An Illustrative Model
In the following partial equilibrium model rms produce multiple output types goods
and services and must decide how to allocate their accumulated expertise, or knowledge,
across the production of each. We take the level of expertise as exogenous in the model and
explore its content in the empirics. The scarce nature of the expertise, and its connement
to the rm, induces a tradeo¤ in goods and services production and generates predictions
regarding how rms adjust production in the face of changing market conditions, such as
lower manufacturing import tari¤s.6
Demand
We consider a multi-country partial-equilibrium setting. In each country, there is a con-
tinuum of industries in which a representative agent consumes industry-specic goods and
services. The agentspreferences over total industry output are Cobb-Douglas everywhere
such that the share of aggregate expenditure spent on industry j is j, where
R 1
0
jdj = 1.
Furthermore, the share of industry j expenditure that is spent on services output from
that industry is j. We therefore denote by EjS  jjE and EjG  j(1   j)E the
expenditure on services and goods output, respectively, from industry j, where E is total
expenditure in the economy.
We assume that preferences for goods and services are separable and within an indus-
try are given by independent Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility functions.
There is a large number of rms active in each industry and each rm provides one good
and one services variety.7 Firms are monopolistically competitive and ignore the impact
of their choices on aggregate quantities when setting prices. The CES demand for the
variety of good and the variety of service produced by rm i in industry j from country
n can be written separately as:
qijnG = p
 
ijnGP

jnGEjnG (1)
qijnS = p
 
ijnSP

jnSEjnS (2)
where  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties of goods and  > 1
6An alternative framework is that of Bloom et al. (2012) in which rms reallocate production factors
in bad timeswhen the opportunity cost of doing so is relatively low. Di¤erent from that paper, here we
focus on the long run while explicitly modeling the degree of rivalry in the use of inputs across di¤erent
types of production.
7Because the number of varieties available to rms is unlimited, no rm would ever want to choose a
variety already produced by another rm.
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denotes the elasticity of substitution across services varieties. The industry price indices in
country n can be written as PjnG =
hR
!G
nG
[pG (!G)]
1  d!G +
R
!G


nG
[pG (!

G)]
1  d!G
i 1
1 
and PjnS =
hR
!S
nS
[pS (!S)]
1  d!S +
R
!S


nS
[pS (!

S)]
1  d!S
i 1
1 
, where 
G and 
S
denote, respectively, the set of services and goods varieties available from home produc-
ers in country n and 
nG and 


nS the sets of foreign varieties. In the following, we take
conditions on all markets (i.e., PjnG, PjnS, EjnG, and EjnS) as exogenous and explore
rm production choices in response to changes in these conditions. In the empirics, we
will control for market conditions through appropriate proxy variables and xed-e¤ect
combinations. For ease of notation, we drop industry subscripts j from now on.
Production
We assume that rm is production functions for goods and services take the following
form:
YiG = iGTiGLiG (3)
YiS = iSTiSLiS (4)
where ilTil is a rm-specic productivity term that is comprised of a xed, exoge-
nously determined component, il, and an endogenously chosen component, Til, where
l 2 (G;S). The rms labor input is Lil.
One of the key feature of the model is our interpretation of Til which, motivated by
the stylized facts and discussion above, we assume to reect the extent to which the
rms accumulated industry-specic expertise is directed toward one output type or the
other. Over time rms both passively and actively accumulate knowledge (expertise)
about the products they are selling and the markets they are selling to. Since this
knowledge is, to some extent, embodied in workers and managers whose time is limited,
it must be apportioned e¢ ciently within the rm. This is a notion that the business
literature has consistently found evidence for for instance, Visnjic and Van Looy (2009)
summarize the accepted view as follows: When a rm starts to provide services...there is
a natural knowledge relatedness to be exploited on the level of technological capabilities
and knowhow that can be transferred from product engineering departments to the service
activities of the rm...Technological expertise represents assets that can be leveraged when
engaging in service activities.
Formally, we assume that the stock of expertise is both xed within the rm and
rivalrous in its use across output types in the sense that increased use of expertise in
producing one output type reduces the expertise available in producing the other output
type. We model the degree of rivalry in expertise across goods and services production
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in the following reduced-form way:
Ti =
 
(TiG)
t + (TiS)
t
1=t
(5)
where we assume that t 2 (0;1) and governs the extent of rivalry in the use of expertise
across output types. Note that a higher t implies less rivalry: for t ! 1, rms can use
the full amount of Ti in both goods and services production.
We assume that rms exporting to foreign destinations face standard variable iceberg-
type trade costs in goods and services, denoted by Gj and 
S
j , respectively. Given this
setup, the prot maximization problem of rm i selling to N markets is:
max
piG;piS ;TiG;TiS
i =
XN
n=1
[pinGYinG + pinSYinS   wi (LinG + LinS)]
s:t: Ti =
 
(TiG)
t + (TiS)
t
1=t
where piG and piS are price vectors containing the prices charged in each destination
market (including the rms home market), and LinG = GnYinG=iGTiG and LinS =
SnYinS=iSTiS are the amounts of labor required to deliver YinG and YinS units of goods
and services to country n, respectively.
Substituting in from (1), (2), and (5), this is equivalent to:
max
piG;piS ;TiG
i =
XN
n=1

p1 inGP
 1
nG EnG + p
1 
inS P
 1
nS EnS

 wi
0B@
XN
n=1
Gn p
 
inGP
 1
nG EnG
iGTiG
+
XN
n=1
Snp
 
inSP
 1
nS EnS
iS ((Ti)t   (TiG)t)1=t
1CA
The solutions for the rms optimal prices for each industry in each destination are given
by:
pinG =

   1
Gnwi
iGTiG
(6)
pinS =

   1
Snwi
iS ((Ti)t   (TiG)t)1=t
(7)
The rm faces a clear tradeo¤. For instance, by directing more expertise toward
goods production, increasing TiG, the rm is able to lower its output price for goods and
improve its competitiveness in the goods market at the expense of services production.
Ultimately, the rms optimal allocation will depend on the relative marginal protability
of goods versus services across all markets. Solving for this optimal allocation decision,
and substituting in the optimal prices (6) and (7), the equilibrium expertise directed
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toward goods production can be written (services is symmetric):
T
 
t
iG
 
Ti
TiG
t
  1
!1+t 
t
=

 1iG

 1iS
RMCi (8)
where iG 


 1
wi
iG
 1
, iS 


 1
wi
iS
 1
, and RMCi 
PN
n=1(Sn)
1 
P  1nS EnSPN
n=1(
G
n )
1 P 1nG EnG
sum-
marizes the relative market conditionsfaced by rm i, i.e., the relative residual demand
for its goods and services in all locations. The allocation decision is therefore a function
of relative market conditions (RMC), the rms aggregate stock of expertise (Ti), the
elasticity parameters associated with goods and services markets (, ), and the degree
of rivalry in the use of expertise within the rm (t).
We can also derive the (partial equilibrium) goods and services revenues that the rm
receives in each market, which are given by:
RinG =


   1
1  
Gnwi
iGTiG
1 
(PnG)
EnG (9)
RinS =


   1
1  
Snwi
iSTiS
1 
(PnS)
EnS (10)
where the optimal allocation of TiS and TiG is given by (8) and its services counterpart.
Comparative Statics
The focus of the empirics will be on the extent to which rms alter their production
strategy in the face of trade liberalization, i.e., in the face of lower tari¤s on goods
imports. In the model, a decline in domestic import tari¤s leads to a fall in the goods
price index at home (PHG), and thus a corresponding decline in the domestic residual
demand for goods. Reiterating the results from above, condition (8) indicates that the
rms response will depend on its aggregate stock of expertise (Ti), the extent to which
expertise is freely availablewithin the rm (governed by t), and the demand elasticities
 and .
The result is an ambiguous response on the part of rms to lower import tari¤s. To see
this, we can di¤erentiate the equilibrium condition (8) with respect to the domestic goods
price index, PHG.8 This leads to su¢ cient conditions under which the rm will respond
by reallocating expertise toward services provision. The ip side are conditions under
which the rm will respond by increasing the expertise allocated to goods production.
8In our partial equilibrium framework, PHG and its components are taken as exogenous so that we can
take derivatives with respect to PHG. Di¤erentiating with respect to PHG is equivalent to di¤erentiating
with respect to domestic import tari¤s in this setting (see below).
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Proposition 1 Fight: Firms will ghtfollowing a decline in domestic goods import
tari¤s, @TiG
@PHG
< 0, when:
(   )

TiG
Ti
t
> (1  t)   + t(1 + t):
That is, when the price index in the domestic goods market falls, rms reallocate T from
provision of services to production of goods. The above will hold for all rms when 1+t <
 < .
Proof is relegated to the appendix 
Recall that expertise serves to enhance productivity, such that by choosing the allo-
cation of expertise the rm is in e¤ect choosing its relative productivity across output
types. When the goods elasticity () is large relative to the services elasticity (), the
marginal increase in prots associated with a marginal reallocation of expertise toward
goods production exceeds the increase from allocating additional expertise toward ser-
vices provision. Thus, the rm will shift T from services to goods in order to lower the
goods price and remain viable in that market.
In addition, from (5) we can see that for a given stock of expertise, Ti, both TiG and
TiS decrease as t falls. In e¤ect, this is because for smaller t (more rivalrous expertise)
there is less sharedexpertise across output types. As a result, a further implication of
Proposition 1 is that expertise must be su¢ ciently rival in order for reallocation to be
e¢ cient i.e., t must be su¢ ciently small for rms to remove resources from services in
order to maintain standing in the goods market. In this case, rms are willing to reenforce
their position in goods because of potentially severe losses in market shares, and have to
remove resources from services to do so because knowledge is relatively non-transferrable.
We believe, and our empirics will support, a more intuitive scenario where rms ee
from competition.
Proposition 2 Flee: Firms will ee following a decline in goods import tari¤s,
@TiG
@PHG
> 0, when:
(   )

TiS
Ti
t
> t(   1  t):
That is, when the price index in the domestic goods market falls, rms reallocate T from
production of goods to provision of services. The above will hold for all rms when,
 <  < 1 + t.
Proof is relegated to the appendix 
Now, a large t, reecting less rivalrous expertise within the rm, makes it more likely
that rms ee from competition. In this case, rms have more resources simultaneously
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available to both output types and can therefore shift production toward the relatively
less competitive services sector with only a relatively small loss in market share in the
goods market.
In short, rms face a ee or ght decision which turns on the relative price elasticities
of the two markets and the degree of rivalry of rm-specic exportise. Since the empirics
will exploit reductions in import tari¤s (GH) as a source of trade liberalization, it is
worth being explicit about the role of tari¤s in the model. Propositions 1 and 2 imply
the following:
Corollary 2.1 When Proposition 1 holds, @TiG
@GH
< 0. When Proposition 2 holds @TiG
@GH
> 0.
These conditions follow straightforwardly from the positive relationship between the
price indices and import tari¤s. The empirics will test these predictions directly.
Finally, for a given value of the rivalry parameter, t, the size of the aggregate stock
of expertise matters for rm adjustment. Formally:
Proposition 3 Given equilibrium condition (8) the sign of @
2TiG
@PHG@Ti
will be the same as
the sign of @TiG
@PHG
, as long as the elasticity of expertise in services with respect to total
expertise is greater than unity, @TS
@T
T
TS
> 1.
Proof is relegated to the appendix 
Consider the case in which rms ee (i.e., @TiG
@PHG
> 0). Proposition 3 states that the
extent to which a rm ees is heterogeneous across rms, and is a function of the rms
stock of expertise i.e., rms with a relatively large stock of expertise will shift relatively
more into services in response to trade liberalization.
To summarize, we motivated the structure of our model in large part by pointing
to the reduction in UK manufacturing import tari¤s and the simultaneous growth of
services sales by UK manufacturing rms relative to their goods sales. In addition,
we found a strong negative correlation between goods and services revenues within UK
rms, suggesting a tradeo¤ in production over the period. The structure of our model
led straightforwardly to Propositions 1 and 2, and Corollary 1, which indicate that it
is unclear whether rms will ee or ght when faced with trade liberalization, with the
response depending on demand conditions in the two sectors and the degree of rivalry
in the use of rm-level expertise. Finally, Proposition 3 indicates that having a larger
stock of expertise magnies the extent of reallocation when trade liberalizes, whatever its
direction. We next describe the data we use to determine and evaluate the empirically
relevant cases.
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3 Econometric Specication and Data
Our main empirical specications are motivated by the rms revenue functions, (9) and
(10), which provide guidance as to which control variables should be included.
First, the revenue functions indicate the need for rm-level controls for input prices,
given by wij, as well as controls for productivity shocks at the rm level, iS. To this
end, we include the average wage bill and labor productivity of the rm. Throughout,
we also control for year xed e¤ects which will capture any macro-level trends in input
prices and technologies. In our preferred specications, we also add rm xed e¤ects and
two-digit industry time trends. These will control for, respectively, rm-specic time-
invariant components and productivity trends as well as trends in aggregate expenditure
on each industrys output, which in the model are given by the terms EjS and EjG.
The revenue functions also indicate that we should control for both the direct and
indirect e¤ects of variation in all four trade barriers: import and export barriers associated
with both goods and services. Again from (9) and (10), the direct e¤ects are those
operating through the export barriers, Gj and 
S
j , and through the import barriers,
which work through the price indices, PjG and PjS. In addition, variation in each of
these variables will a¤ect revenues through the optimal allocation of expertise, TiS and
TiG, which are both a function of all four trade barriers. These are what we consider the
indirect e¤ects, and they are reected in the partial derivatives of (8) with respect to one
of the trade barriers.
These considerations lead us to the following reduced-form specication relating the
ratio of a rms revenues from services relative to goods (RijtS=RijtG) to the proxies just
discussed:9
RijtS
RijtG
= exp

i + t + 1
M
jtG + 2
X
jtG + 3
M
jtS + 4
X
jtS
+ 5 ln wijt + 6 ln ijt + mt

+ ijt (11)
where the s represent import and export barriers for goods and services associated with
rm is industry j, i and t are rm and year xed e¤ects, respectively, wijt and  ijt are
a rms average wage and labor productivity and mt is a 2-digit industry time trend.
The main coe¢ cient of interest is the one on goods import tari¤s, 2. Its sign will tell
9Equations (9) and (10) show revenues from individual markets, including the UK. Total goods and
services revenues are the summation of revenues from all locations. These revenues will depend on trade
barriers imposed by these locations on the exports of rm i (here proxied by XjtG and 
X
jtS) as well as on
rms from third markets. Unfortunately, we do not have data for such third-market trade barriers and
multi-collinearity issues would probably prevent their inclusion in any case. However, we note that over
our sample period, exports only accounted for 19% of total services sales on average, so that the omission
of third-market barriers is unlikely to be of major importance. (We do not have rm-level data on goods
exports.) In our robustness checks we also estimate a version of (11) in which we subtract the value of
exports from RijtS before dividing by goods revenues, thus using only domestic services revenues.
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us whether rms react to tari¤ reductions by increasing services output relative to goods
output (2 < 0) or by reducing it (2 > 0). While our main interest is in the output
of services relative to goods, we will also estimate versions of (11) in which we will use
goods or services revenues separately as the dependent variable. This will allow us to
judge whether changes in relative revenues are driven by goods, services, or both.
Note that we have chosen an exponential conditional mean function which we will
estimate via Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) techniques. The use of PPML
estimation is motivated by a number of specic features of our data. First, there are
many zeros for the value of services revenue i.e., the majority of rms in our data do
not provide services.10 A log-linear specication would thus need to drop a large part
of the sample. Second, given the highly skewed distribution of revenues across rms it
is unlikely that the unexplained variation in (11), or its counterparts with goods and
services revenues only, will be homoskedastic. As Santos-Silva and Tenreyo (2006) point
out, the log of the error term is then likely to be correlated with the regressors, due to
the mechanical correlation between the mean and variance of a logged variable. PPML
estimation addresses both of these issues. Throughout, we cluster standard errors at the
4-digit industry level, the level of variation of our regressor of interest (MjtG).
The second key prediction of our model is that to the extent that rms ee the goods
market in response to lower import tari¤s, those with a larger stock of accumulated ex-
pertise (T ) should see a stronger shift into services provision. Given the interpretation of
T as expertise, the closest empirical proxy available in our data is expenditure on research
and development (R&D), and in particular the accumulated stock of R&D expenditure.
In practice, however, there might be other determinants which inuence the extent to
which rms transition into services when faced with lower manufacturing import tari¤s.
Here, we also examine heterogeneity with respect to rm labor productivity and the stock
of physical capital. These variables can be thought of as proxies for rm capabilities more
generally and may therefore a¤ect rm responsiveness to trade liberalization. Formally,
we estimate the following specication:
RijtS
RijtG
= exp
"
ij + t + 1(lnR&Dijt  MjtG) + 2(lnCapInvijt  MjtG)
+3(lnLabProdijt  MjtG) + 4(R&Dijt) + 5(CapInvijt) (12)
+6(LabProdijt) + 7
M
jtG + 8
X
jtG + 9
M
jtS + 10
X
jtS
+11 ln wijt + 12 ln ijS + mt
#
+ ijt
where we are interested in particular in the interaction term coe¢ cients 1; 2 and 3.
10In our baseline specication (see Table 1 below), 70 percent of rm-year observations for service
revenues and the ratio of services to goods revenues are zero.
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Firm Data
The primary dataset used is the UK Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which con-
tains the relevant rm variables over the period 1997-2007. The ARD is drawn from
an underlying register of the universe of UK businesses and is the UK equivalent of the
U.S. Longitudinal Respondents Database. The data consist of the full population of large
businesses (those with more than 100 or 250 employees depending on the year) as well as
a random sample of smaller businesses.11 The ARD includes many establishment-level
variables and, for our purposes, the most relevant will be the total value of services pro-
vided by the establishment, the total value of services exported by the establishment,
and the total value of goods of own production produced.12 In addition, we use the
ARD to construct the physical capital stock of each rm, applying the perpetual in-
ventory method applied to annual rm investments in plant and machinery. Our labor
productivity measure is calculated from the ARD data as rm value added per worker.
For the estimation of the interaction regression in (12) we combine these data with
information on the annual research and development (R&D) investments by rms, drawn
from the Business Expenditure on Research and Development (BERD) dataset. We con-
struct the R&D stock for each rm using the perpetual inventory method applied to the
BERD ows, adopting an economic depreciation rate of 30 percent.13 Our nal dataset
contains between 6,441 and 38,617 individual rms depending on the specication14, cov-
ering 243 4-digit manufacturing industries over the period 1997-2007.
Trade Barriers
We collect goods import tari¤s (MjtG) from the World Trade Organization Tari¤Database
and note that they include both Most Favored Nation tari¤s as well as regional trade
agreements signed during the period. We note that while average import tari¤s were
already relatively low in 1997 (around 5%), this hides substantial sectoral heterogeneity.
In 1997, ad-valorem tari¤s reached from 0% to over 40% in some sectors. By 2007, average
tari¤ levels had halfed to around 2.5% and the highest tari¤s to just over 20%, implying
tari¤ reductions of up to 20%.
The estimation of (11) also requires average goods export tari¤s (XjtG) faced by UK
rms in foreign destinations. These come from the United NationsTrade Analysis and
11For a comprehensive description of this dataset see Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003) or for a
summary see Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011).
12The ARD does not provide a breakdown of the types of services produced by manufacturing rms.
However, we can observe types of services exported by a subset of manufacturing rms by linking the
ARD to the International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). See Appendix A for details and the principal
services exported by manufacturing rms.
13We choose this value following the convention in the literature see, for instance, Bloom, Gri¢ th
and Van Reenen (2002). However, our results are virtually unchanged for values near this.
14In specications that include the R&D variables the number of rms is considerably reduced due the
smaller sample of rms drawn for the BERD.
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Information System (TRAINS) and we use the cleaned and expanded version prepared by
Feenstra and Romalis (2014).15 We aggregate these country-product-year specic tari¤s
up to the UK SIC industry level as a trade-weighted sum across destination countries.
The resulting ad valorem tari¤ varies at the year- and 4-digit SIC-level and captures the
average goods export barriers faced by UK manufacturing rms in a given industry and
year.
For measures of services trade barriers (MjtS and 
X
jtS) we rely on the OECDs Product
Market Regulation index which quanties barriers to services trade in di¤erent service
types for OECD and selected third countries.16 Since our empirical analysis will take
place at the UK SIC industry level, while the trade barrier index is classied by service
type, we need to determine the services types that correspond to each SIC industry. To
do this, we focus on the service types that are imported and exported by rms in a
particular SIC industry, obtained from the UK International Trade in Services Inquiry
(ITIS),17 which we use to construct import and export trade barrier indices at the SIC
industry level as a simple trade-weighted sum of the OECD service type measures for
each industry.
Note that both manufacturing import and export tari¤s are negotiated by the Euro-
pean Commission for the European Union as a whole. They are thus likely to be largely
exogenous to UK industrial trends. Services trade barriers are more heterogeneous and
still more inuenced by national policies. But even here, bilateral negotiations with other
countries and trading blocks fell within the remit of the European Commission for the
second half of our sample period.18
4 Empirical Results
In this section we present our empirical results. We rst show that lower manufacturing
import tari¤s led rms to increase services production relative to goods production. We
then explore the rm-level characteristics that inuence the extent of this transition.
Firm Response to Trade Liberalization
Baseline Results
Table 1 shows the results from estimating (11). In column (1), we only include import
barriers for goods and services as well as year xed e¤ects. Columns (2)-(6) add additional
regressors and xed e¤ects which progressively make the specications more restrictive.
15We thank John Romalis for making these data available to us.
16These data are available at www.oecd.org/economy/growth/.
17The ITIS is an annual, repeated cross-section survey that collects information on companiesinter-
national transactions in services. See Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011) for a detailed description.
18The European Commission obtained explicit powers to negotiate services trade policy in addition to
goods trade policy in the Treaty of Nice (2001).
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In column (2), we add export barriers in goods and services trade faced by British man-
ufacturing rms. In column (3), we add rm-level wages and labor productivity and in
column (4), we also control for 4-digit industry xed e¤ects. Finally, column (5) adds
rm xed e¤ects and column (6) includes two-digit industry time trends as well.
Throughout, the coe¢ cient on our main variable of interest (manufacturing import
tari¤s) is negative and highly statistically signicant, indicating that lower import tari¤s
lead to higher services revenues relative to goods revenues. This demonstrates that, at
least on average, rms ee import competition rather than ght it.
The estimated coe¢ cient magnitudes are also economically signicant. According to
our preferred specication which includes the full set of controls, rm xed e¤ects and
2-digit industry time trends (column 6 in Table 1), a one percentage point reduction
in goods import tari¤s led to an approximate increase of 22% in the ratio of services
to goods revenues. Over the period 1997-2007, goods import tari¤s declined by around
2.5 percentage points, so that the tari¤-induced increase in the services to goods ratio
is around 55%. For comparison, the (unweighted) mean of the services-to-goods ratio
across the rms in our sample doubled from 5% to 10% between 1997 and 2007.19 That
is, our results suggest that around half of the increase in our dependent variable over the
sample period can be explained by trade liberalization.
Our next question is whether the shift to greater relative services sales is due to higher
services revenues, lower goods revenues or a combination of both. Tables 2 and 3 show
results for the same specications as in Table 1, but replace relative revenues by services
and goods revenues, respectively. As seen, lower manufacturing import tari¤s led to both
higher services revenues and lower goods revenues. The results are most signicant for
services revenues, where we nd a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient on goods
import tari¤s throughout. For goods, the results are slightly less robust, but the relevant
coe¢ cient is also either positive and signicant or insignicant, indicating that lower
manufacturing import tari¤s did decrease goods revenues or at least did not increase
them.
Robustness Checks
Focus on Domestic Sales
As discussed previously (see footnote 9), the revenue functions (9) and (10) on which
we based our baseline specication (11) apply to an individual market. In order to
achieve a tighter link to the theoretical revenue functions, we now focus on domestic
revenues in the construction of our dependent variable, rather than total revenues which
also include export revenues. That is, we construct domestic services revenues (RDOMijtS )
19Note that these the gures are not directly comparable to Figure 2 because they are not size-weighted,
are based on a slightly di¤erent sample, and the denominator is di¤erent (goods revenues in this section,
total revenues in Figure 2).
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as total services revenues minus services exports. Unfortunately, the ARD only contains
data on export revenues for services but not for goods. Thus, we continue to use total
goods revenues as the denominator of our dependent variable. For comparison with our
earlier results from Table 2, we also estimate a specication with RDOMijtS as the dependent
variable.
In Table 4, we regress the newly constructed revenue ratio (RDOMijtS =RijtG) on the
same variables as in our baseline specication.20 The results are very similar to our
baseline results from Table 1. When we use domestic services revenues as our dependent
variable (Table 5), we obtain slightly larger coe¢ cient estimates in absolute terms on
our manufacturing import tari¤ regressor but otherwise, the pattern of results is very
similar to the one presented in Table 2. A possible explanation for these similarities is
that services exports accounted for only a relatively small fraction of total manufacturing
services revenues over our sample period (19% on average).
The Role of O¤shoring and Factoryless" Producers
Here we consider a potential alternative explanation for our ndings. In short, it
is possible that the pattern observed in the regression results above may be due to an
increase in geographic specialization on the part of multinationals. In other words, in re-
sponse to lower manufacturing import tari¤s UK rms may simply be moving their goods
production overseas while increasing their focus on the provision of headquarters services.
For instance, Bernard and Fort (2013) note the prevalence of factoryless manufacturing
rms in the US, which they nd primarily consist of rms that focus their activities on
goods design while also coordinating the manufacture and assembly of products in (often)
overseas locations. It is therefore possible that we are simply observing a trend toward
more factoryless rms in the UK. We note that this possibility does not undermine the
goal of this paper, which is simply to estimate the causal relationship between goods trade
liberalization and increased services provision on the part of UK rms, independent of
the rms motivations for the transition. It does, however, potentially add nuance to the
story, as it addresses whether rms are simply ceasing goods production in the face of
competition, or are relocating goods production.
We can test for evidence of this mechanism by simply repeating regression (11) but,
rather than using domestic services revenues as the dependent variable, we instead use
the total volume of a¢ liate servicestrade associated with each rm. This service type
is one of the categories within the ITIS dataset, and should be associated with increasing
production fragmentation within the rm. That is, if rms do indeed respond to goods
trade liberalization by focusing their domestic activities on the provision of headquarters
20Notice that domestic services revenue still depend on all four sets of trade barriers included in spec-
ication (11) because these barriers indirectly impact revenues through their inuence on the allocation
of expertise (compare the discussion in Section 3).
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services, we should observe a positive correlation between tari¤ reductions and exports
of headquarters services.21 Table 6 shows that the evidence for this hypothesis is mixed
at best. In our most basic specication which only includes year xed e¤ects and the
two import barrier variables (column 1), the coe¢ cient on manufacturing import tari¤s is
indeed negative and signicant, although its magnitude is only around one fourth of the
e¤ect of import tari¤s on total services sales (see Table 2). Once we include additional
control variables and more restrictive sets of xed e¤ects, however, the import tari¤
regressor becomes insignicant. We conclude that a shift toward increased provision of
headquarters services in response to trade liberalization is unlikely to have played a major
role over our sample period.
Determinants of FirmsResponse to Trade Liberalization
We next estimate specication (12) in which relative rm-level service-to-goods revenues
are the dependent variable and goods import tari¤s are now interacted with additional
regressors i.e., we allow for rm heterogeneity in the response to trade liberalization.
As discussed, we interpret this as an exploration of the relevant proxies for what we term
expertise in the model, given by T . To reiterate the theoretical result that we are
interested in, Proposition 3 states that when rms possess a greater stock of the rival
input, they will be more responsive to trade liberalization.
Table 7 reports the results. We again start with a basic specication which includes
only year dummies, and become progressively more restrictive by adding additional con-
trol variables and combinations of xed e¤ects. Column (6) contains our preferred spec-
ications, which includes rm-level xed e¤ects and two-digit industry time trends, re-
spectively. This time, our main interest is with the coe¢ cient on the interaction terms
between goods import tari¤s and the R&D stock.
The results indicate a strong role for R&D in promoting the rms response to trade
liberalization. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative and highly statistically
signicant in our preferred specications. Firms with higher R&D stocks thus see a
stronger shift into services relative to goods revenues as manufacturing import tari¤s come
down. Interestingly, we nd the opposite sign pattern for the capital stock interaction
term. This seems intuitively plausible: rms which have invested heavily in machinery
and equipment will nd it harder to move into service provision given that the previous
investment is of little use in that area. By contrast, we do not nd any clear pattern
regarding the interaction of goods import tari¤s and labor productivity the relevant
21We construct exports of headquarters services by matching our regression sample (which is from the
ARD) to the International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS). If a rm cannot be matched and reports zero
services exports or zero services production in the ARD, we set exports of headquarter services for that
rm to zero. There are also a few rms which report positive services exports in the ARD but cannot be
matched to the ITIS; we drop these from our sample. (Results are similar if we set headquarters services
exports for such rms to zero instead of dropping them.)
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coe¢ cients are insignicant throughout.
Taken together with our earlier empirical ndings, the results suggest that, on average,
trade liberalization in the goods market leads rms to ee toward services provision, and
that the most knowledge-intensive rms, and thus with relatively small past investments
in physical capital, are the most responsive.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the face of trade liberalization domestic rms are often forced out of the market,
whereas others adapt and survive. In this paper we have focused on a new channel
of adaptation, namely the shift toward increased provision of services in lieu of goods
production. Using rm-level data for the UK over the period 1997-2007, we have explored
the link between lower manufacturing import tari¤s and the rms tradeo¤between goods
production and the provision of services.
We motivated our analysis with an illustrative partial equilibrium model in which
a rm has to decide how to allocate a factor in xed supply (expertise) between the
production of two products. Depending on relative demand elasticities and the degree
to which the scarce factor can be shared between products, rms decide to either ght
or eewhen faced with an inward shift in the residual demand curve for one of their
products. In each case, the reaction is amplied if there is a higher stock of initial
expertise.
We tested the models predictions in the context of UK manufacturing rmschoice
between goods and services production when faced with lower EU manufacturing import
tari¤s. We found that lower tari¤s caused rms to shift into service provision, and out
of goods provision. The magnitude of our results is highly signicant, both statistically
and economically. Results from our preferred specication suggest that around half of
the observed increase in the ratio of services to goods revenues among UK manufacturing
rms is due to lower manufacturing import tari¤s.
We also examined which factors inuence the extent of the transition into services
following goods tari¤ reductions. Consistent with our models predictions, we found that
a rms stock of R&D is strongly associated with a successful transition. By contrast, a
higher capital stock was associated with a signicantly weaker shift into services provision.
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A Data Appendix: Services Types in our Data
As discussed in Section 3, our main dataset (the ARD) does not provide a breakdown
of the types of services produced by manufacturing rms but only states the total value
of services provision and exports. However, we can observe types of services exported
by a subset of manufacturing rms by linking the ARD to the International Trade in
Services Inquiry (ITIS). The ITIS is an annual, repeated cross-section survey that collects
information on companiesinternational transactions in services and is described in detail
in Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011).
Table A.1 shows the principal services types exported by the rms in our regression
sample which can be linked to the ITIS. As seen, revenues from Royalties and Licenses and
from the provision of Technical Services (such as engineering or surveying services) are the
most common type of services exports. These are followed by Agricultural, Mining, and
On-Site Processing Services, Business and Professional Services, and Communications
Services (which includes postal and telecommunications services).
B Proof of Propositions
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
We begin by totally di¤erentiating (8) with respect to the goods price index, PG. This
yields:
@TG
@PG
=
@RMCi
@PG
RMCi
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(13)
where 
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The sign is therefore determined by the ambiguous term, 
, that takes into account
the relative use of T in each output type and its relation to the elasticities of substitution
in each sector. The su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 1 can be derived simply by noting
that 
 will be positive when both  >  and  > 1 + t. Similarly, it will be negative
under the reverse conditions. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Di¤erentiating (13) with respect to T yields:
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where 
 is dened as above. The sign of this derivative depends once again on the relative
values of the substitution parameters (; ; and t). However, under the su¢ cient condi-
tions from Propositions 1 and 2, we can pin down the direction of the second derivative.
We have two cases:
1. When 1 + t <  < , Proposition 1 holds since 
 > 0. Since @TG
@T
> 0, @
2TG
@PHG@T
will
be the same sign as @TG
@PHG
when 1  T
TS
@TS
@T
< 0.
2. When  <  < 1+t, Proposition 2 holds since 
 < 0. Again, since @TG
@T
> 0, @
2TG
@PHG@T
will be the same sign as @TG
@PHG
when 1  T
TS
@TS
@T
< 0.

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Table 1: Baseline Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods 
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Goods Import Tariffs -0.916*** -0.893*** -0.859*** -0.141** -0.209*** -0.217*** 
(0.301) (0.329) (0.326) (0.0634) (0.0644) (0.0656)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.148 -0.147 0.0103 -0.0522 -0.0507 
(0.130) (0.125) (0.138) (0.0468) (0.0471)
Services Export Barriers 0.129 0.140 2.701** 0.0404 0.119 
(0.140) (0.131) (1.272) (0.0855) (0.0919)
Services Import Barriers 0.945 1.115* 0.971* 4.207 -0.210 -0.835 
(0.608) (0.597) (0.575) (4.469) (1.047) (1.248)
Log(labor productivity) 0.114 -0.00530 -0.275 -0.272 
(0.239) (0.204) (0.228) (0.227)
Log(average wage) 0.146** -0.0173 0.957*** 0.954*** 
(0.0671) (0.0938) (0.359) (0.359)
Observations 109,598 107,073 97,502 97,502 97,502 97,502
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods. See text for details. Data Source: 
ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) 
Table 2: Services Revenues as Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Services 
revenues 
Services 
revenues 
Services 
revenues 
Services 
revenues 
Services 
revenues 
Services 
revenues 
Goods Import Tariffs -0.597*** -0.478** -0.319* -0.0132 -0.0241** -0.0255**
(0.223) (0.209) (0.167) (0.0173) (0.0114) (0.0122)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.275 -0.154 0.0147 -0.0934** -0.0951**
(0.249) (0.121) (0.0697) (0.0456) (0.0466)
Services Export Barriers -0.720 -0.160 0.0820 0.113 0.133
(1.510) (0.428) (0.0925) (0.0824) (0.0823)
Services Import Barriers 2.526*** 2.598** 2.551*** 4.281*** 0.632 0.711
(0.821) (1.009) (0.740) (1.323) (0.426) (0.450)
Log(labor productivity) 0.429** 0.522*** 0.206*** 0.193***
(0.176) (0.192) (0.0701) (0.0692)
Log(average wage) 1.177*** 0.977*** 0.403*** 0.395***
(0.0809) (0.0391) (0.137) (0.135)
Observations 114,006 111,436 101,383 101,383 101,383 101,383
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is a firm’s revenues from services sales. See text for details. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD) 
Table 3: Goods Revenues as Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Goods revenues Goods revenues Goods revenues Goods revenues Goods revenues Goods revenues
Goods Import Tariffs 0.0588*** 0.0229* 0.00673 0.00373** 3.16e-05 -0.00161 
(0.0124) (0.0135) (0.00490) (0.00173) (0.00251) (0.00231)
Goods Export Tariffs 0.0793*** 0.0294*** 0.0113 0.00324 0.00274 
(0.0157) (0.0101) (0.0114) (0.00542) (0.00578)
Services Export Barriers -0.00613 0.0106 -0.0331* -0.0229 -0.0252* 
(0.0616) (0.0424) (0.0190) (0.0145) (0.0144)
Services Import Barriers 0.373* 0.322 0.105 0.0145 0.111** 0.0998** 
(0.221) (0.228) (0.104) (0.233) (0.0447) (0.0455)
Log(labor productivity) 0.316*** 0.352*** 0.170*** 0.168***
(0.0550) (0.0454) (0.0255) (0.0231)
Log(average wage) 0.978*** 0.956*** 0.700*** 0.699***
(0.0259) (0.0153) (0.0314) (0.0306)
Observations 113,127 110,557 100,608 100,608 100,608 100,608
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is a firm’s revenues from goods sales. See text for details. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD) 
Table 4: Using Domestic Services Revenues in the Construction of the Revenue Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods 
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Goods Import Tariffs -0.795*** -0.734** -0.694** -0.191** -0.248*** -0.253*** 
(0.294) (0.297) (0.291) (0.0834) (0.0779) (0.0789)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.160 -0.148 -0.0588 -0.129 -0.126 
(0.155) (0.141) (0.145) (0.0802) (0.0810)
Services Export Barriers -2.856 -2.550 0.0611 0.113 0.167 
(2.915) (2.876) (0.624) (0.233) (0.169)
Services Import Barriers 1.631*** 1.493** 1.335** 11.70 -0.349 -0.889 
(0.619) (0.687) (0.633) (7.134) (0.798) (0.807)
Log(labor productivity) 0.100 0.00946 -0.172 -0.171 
(0.289) (0.235) (0.231) (0.231)
Log(average wage) 0.208** -0.00267 0.981** 0.992*** 
(0.0962) (0.113) (0.382) (0.383)
Observations 100,470 98,198 90,627 90,627 90,627 90,627
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is the ratio of a firm’s domestic services revenues to total goods revenues. Domestic services revenues are 
constructed as total services revenues minus services exports. See text for details. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) 
Table 5: Domestic Services Revenues as Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Dom. services 
revenues 
Dom. services 
revenues 
Dom. services 
revenues 
Dom. services 
revenues 
Dom. services 
revenues 
Dom. services 
revenues 
Goods Import Tariffs -0.696*** -0.553** -0.389** -0.0542*** -0.0850*** -0.0872*** 
(0.256) (0.237) (0.160) (0.0186) (0.0227) (0.0230)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.305 -0.162 0.0687 -0.0920 -0.0917 
(0.297) (0.126) (0.0892) (0.0661) (0.0669)
Services Export Barriers -2.294 -2.047 -0.108 -0.0280 -0.00560 
(2.352) (2.786) (0.587) (0.166) (0.163)
Services Import Barriers 2.365*** 2.209** 2.014*** 4.767** -0.111 -0.218 
(0.847) (1.067) (0.741) (2.336) (0.395) (0.522)
Log(labor productivity) 0.334** 0.418** 0.0161 0.0156 
(0.153) (0.165) (0.122) (0.122)
Log(average wage) 1.190*** 0.948*** 0.310** 0.308** 
(0.0803) (0.0347) (0.127) (0.128)
Observations 104,607 102,293 94,284 94,284 94,284 94,284
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is a firm’s domestic services revenue. Domestic services revenues are constructed as total services revenues 
minus services exports. See text for details. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) 
Table 6: Exports of Headquarters Services 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Exports of 
Headquarters 
Services 
Goods Import Tariffs -0.141*** -0.0269 0.00974 -0.0722 0.0650 0.0745 
(0.0427) (0.0843) (0.0559) (0.125) (0.0476) (0.0467)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.303* -0.248** -0.184 0.174 0.269* 
(0.168) (0.125) (0.300) (0.171) (0.151)
Services Export Barriers -1.329 -1.154 15.30 -2.319 -2.351 
(1.519) (1.639) (10.99) (3.248) (3.502)
Services Import Barriers 3.726** 3.694** 4.032** 1.820 -0.718 -0.454 
(1.526) (1.468) (1.698) (10.77) (1.070) (1.007)
Log(labor productivity) 0.396* 0.255 -0.437*** -0.412** 
(0.221) (0.306) (0.156) (0.161)
Log(average wage) 0.810*** 0.746*** -0.806** -0.791** 
(0.127) (0.133) (0.346) (0.346)
Observations 99,694 97,412 89,858 89,858 89,858 89,858
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry and year Firm and year 
Firm, year and 
2-digit industry 
time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is a firm’s exports of headquarters services. See text for details. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD) and International Trade in Services Inquiry (ITIS).
Table 7: Interaction Regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods 
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods
Ratio 
Services/Goods 
Goods Import Tariffs x 
log(R&D)
-0.0401 -0.0330 -0.0351 0.0387 -0.0545** -0.0538**
(0.0600) (0.0628) (0.0655) (0.0387) (0.0248) (0.0249)
Goods Import Tariffs x 
log(capital stock) 
0.127** 0.121* 0.0889 0.00663 0.0492* 0.0486*
(0.0642) (0.0629) (0.0798) (0.0189) (0.0264) (0.0264)
Goods Import Tariffs x 
log(labor productivity) 
-0.0337 -0.0100 0.0808 0.0212 0.0544 0.0544
(0.0908) (0.0905) (0.0966) (0.0341) (0.0511) (0.0511)
log(R&D) 0.282* 0.250 -0.0220 -0.0795 -0.00974 -0.0142(0.152) (0.182) (0.225) (0.125) (0.156) (0.158)
log(capital stock) -0.384*** -0.363** -0.344* -0.455** -0.341*** -0.340***(0.134) (0.162) (0.185) (0.221) (0.115) (0.116)
log(labor productivity) 0.638** 0.612** 0.156 -0.0159 -0.212 -0.214(0.261) (0.252) (0.237) (0.0886) (0.316) (0.317)
Goods Import Tariffs -0.678 -0.785 -0.928* -0.472*** -0.187 -0.186(0.536) (0.560) (0.557) (0.160) (0.198) (0.198)
Goods Export Tariffs -0.0546 -0.0900 0.451*** -0.0169 -0.0116(0.132) (0.123) (0.114) (0.111) (0.112)
Services Export Barriers -0.747 -0.386 0.358 2.551 2.548(1.848) (0.810) (0.333) (3.236) (3.249)
Services Import Barriers 0.994** 0.974** 0.991** 2.501 2.694** 2.689**(0.446) (0.427) (0.404) (2.520) (1.286) (1.291)
log(average wage) 0.731*** 0.513** 0.939 0.938(0.207) (0.257) (0.596) (0.596)
Observations 19,628 19,297 19,294 19,294 19,294 19,294
Fixed Effects Year only Year only Year only 4-digit industry 
and year 
Firm and year Firm, year, 2-digit 
ind. time trends 
Notes: Table shows results of PPML regressions (figures in brackets below coefficient estimates are standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit 
industry level). The dependent variable is the ratio of a firm’s revenues from services and revenues from goods. See text for details. Data Source: 
ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and Business Expenditure on Research and Development (BERD) dataset. 
Table A.1: Services Types Exported by UK Manufacturing Firms 
Service Type Fraction of Firm-
Years 
Number of Firm-
Years 
Royalties and Licenses 38% 1890 
Technical Services 36% 1787 
Agricultural, Mining, On-Site Processing 
Services 20%
986
Business and Professional Services 18% 890 
Communications Services 11% 542 
Computer and Information Services 8% 382 
Merchanting and Other Trade-Related Services 8% 378 
Other Trade in Services 3% 169 
Personal, Cultural and Recreational Services 2% 86 
Construction Services 2% 79 
Insurance Services 1% 25 
Note: Table shows the fraction and number of firm-years for which we observe the services export 
listed in the first column. Fractions are calculated relative to the total number of firm-year 
observations in our regression sample which can be matched to the ITIS (4,932 observations in total).  
Firms can export more than one service in a given year, so that percentages add up to more than 
100%. Data Source: ONS Annual Respondents Database (ARD), International Trade in Services 
Inquiry (ITIS). 
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